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THE GLASS HOUSE EFFECT: BIG DATA, THE NEW 
OIL, AND THE POWER OF ANALOGY 
Dennis D. Hirsch* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One hears with some frequency today that “data is the new oil.”1  Recently, 
Virginia Rometty, IBM’s Chief Executive Officer, updated the phrase, explaining 
that Big Data is the new oil.2  Most people who use the analogy do so in order to 
convey Big Data’s tremendous value.  Data is an essential resource that powers the 
information economy much like oil has fueled the industrial economy.  Big Data3 
promises a plethora of new uses—the identification and prevention of pandemics, 4 
the emergence of new businesses and business sectors,5 the improvement of health 
care quality and efficiency,6 and enhanced protection of the environment,7 to name 
but a few—just as oil has generated useful plastics, petro-chemicals, lubricants, and 
                                                                                                     
 * Geraldine W. Howell Professor of Law, Capital University Law School.  The Author would like 
to thank Professor Paul Ohm for suggesting the idea for this paper, and for early discussions that helped 
to shape it.  Unless otherwise indicated, the author alone is responsible for the paper’s content.  Portions 
of this Article were included in a paper presented at the Future of Privacy Forum and the Stanford 
Center for Internet & Society’s workshop, Big Data and Privacy: Making Ends Meet, available at 
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/big-data-privacy-workshop-paper-collection. 
 1. See, e.g., Clive Humby, Address at the ANA Senior Marketer’s Summit at the Kellogg School 
(2006); Michael Palmer, Data is the New Oil, ANA MKTG. MAESTROS (Nov. 3, 2006, 5:43 AM), 
http://ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html; Personal Data: The “New Oil” of the 21st 
Century, Panel Discussion of the World Economic Forum on Europe & Central Asia (June 9, 2011), 
available at http://www.weforum.org/sessions/summary/personal-data-new-oil-21st-century. 
 2. Maria Deutscher, IBM’s CEO Says Big Data is Like Oil, Enterprises Need Help Extracting the 
Value, SILICON ANGLE (Mar. 11, 2013), http://siliconangle.com/blog/2013/03/11/ibms-ceo-says-big-
data-is-like-oil-enterprises-need-help-extracting-the-value.  See also VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & 
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK AND 
THINK 16 (2013); Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n., Sloan Cyber Security Lecture: A Call to 
Arms: The Role of Technologists in Protecting Privacy in the Age of Big Data 1 (Oct. 23, 2013), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/call-arms-role-
technologists-protecting-privacy -age-big-data/131023nyupolysloanlecture.pdf (stating that Big Data is 
the “new oil”) [hereinafter Brill Lecture]; Sam Pfeifle, Big Data=Big Oil?, IAPP: THE PRIVACY 
ADVISOR (Apr. 1, 2013), https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/2013_03_20_big_data_big_ 
oil. 
 3. “The term ‘Big Data’ refers to datasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database 
software tools to capture, store, manage and analyze.”  ANN CAVOUKIAN & JEFF JONAS, INFO. & 
PRIVACY COMM’R (ONTARIO, CAN.), PRIVACY BY DESIGN IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 3 (June 8, 2012), 
available at http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/06/pbd-big_data.pdf. 
 4. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
 5. Id. at 3. 
 6. JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR 
INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND PRODUCTIVITY 2 (May 2011), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research/Techno
logy%20and%20Innovation/Big%20Data/MGI_big_data_exec_summary.ashx.  
 7. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 248 (2013). 
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gasoline.  Big Data “is becoming a significant corporate asset, a vital economic 
input, and the foundation of new business models.  It is the oil of the information 
economy.”8  
This Article looks at the analogy in a different way, one not yet developed in 
the scholarly literature.  It examines the underside of the ‘Big Data is the new oil’ 
comparison.  Oil certainly has many productive uses, but it also leads to oil 
pollution.  Big Data is similar.  It produces tremendous benefits, but simultaneously 
generates significant privacy injuries.9  As the data sets get larger, the threat grows 
as well.10  Big Data is like a massive oil tanker navigating the shoals of hackers, 
criminals and human error.  It can make us smarter and wealthier and our lives 
better.  However, like oil, it can also harm us.  Environmental law has developed 
ways to reduce oil pollution.  This Article draws on this environmental law success 
story to identify ways that law and policy can protect privacy in the era of Big 
Data.   
 The Article begins by developing the analogy between oil pollution and 
privacy injuries.  Oil pollutes in two principal ways.  It spills, and so despoils 
beaches, coastlines and waters.  It also produces carbon emissions and so 
contributes to the greenhouse effect and climate change.  Big Data creates 
analogous privacy injuries.  Like oil, it spills.  Data security breaches—such as the 
2013 Target Thanksgiving and Christmas shopping season breach, in which 
hackers gained access to an estimated 70-110 million customer names, credit and 
debit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes11—cause broad harm, 
much as oil spills create wide-spread damage.  Big Data’s privacy impacts are also 
analogous to carbon emissions and climate change. Oil combustion contributes to a 
growing layer of greenhouse gases that traps the sun’s heat, causes climate change, 
and so makes the physical environment less hospitable for humans and other forms 
of life.12  In a similar way, the producers of Big Data are generating layer upon 
layer of personal information.  This build-up increases the hot glare of public 
scrutiny and so makes the social environment less conducive to the growth of the 
human personality which requires a degree of shade and shelter in which to 
                                                                                                     
 8. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 16. 
 9. STANLEY R.M. OLIVEIRA & OSMAR R. ZAÏANE, TOWARDS STANDARDIZATION IN PRIVACY-
PRESERVING DATA MINING § 3.1 (2004), available at http://www.agencia.cnptia.embrapa.br/ 
Repositorio/dm-ssp04ID-9ZWpbbVpUP.pdf (explaining that, while “data mining can be extremely 
valuable in many applications (e.g., business, medical analysis, etc[.]), it can also, in the absence of 
adequate safeguards, violate informational privacy”). 
 10. This is true, first, because more personal data is released.  It is further true because it is easier to 
re-identify large de-identified data sets, than to re-identify small ones. 
 11. See Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/sites/privacyrights.org/files/static/Chronology-of-Data-Breaches_-
_Privacy-Rights-Clearinghouse.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (explaining that Target “customers who 
used a payment card at any of Target's stores nationwide between November 27, 2013 and December 
15, 2013 may have had their payment card information copied for fraudulent purposes. Customer 
names, credit or debit card numbers, card expiration dates, and card security codes were taken and have 
appeared on the black market.”) 
    12. CHRIS WOLD, DAVID HUNTER, & MELISSA POWERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 5 (2009) 
(explaining that the burning of fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide which is “by far the most important” 
man-made greenhouse gas).  
376 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:2 
flourish.  This is not the greenhouse effect, but the glass house effect, since it gives 
each of us the sense that we are living in a glass house.  Climate change is a good 
analogy for a transformation so profound that it is at once happening all around us 
and, at the same time, difficult to grasp and identify.  
In their Harvard Business Review Article, How Strategists Really Think: 
Tapping the Power of Analogy, Professors Gavetti and Rivkin explain that 
analogies can not only help us understand contemporary problems; they can also 
enable us to develop solutions to them.13  Strategic thinkers begin by comparing a 
new problem to a prior one for which they have a remedy.14  Then they take the 
solution to the prior problem, adapt it to the new context, and so develop ideas 
about how to address the current issue.15  The “Big Data is the new oil” analogy is 
powerful in this way. Society has developed legal and policy solutions to oil 
pollution. We should be able to take these measures—the solutions to the familiar 
problem—translate them into the privacy realm, and so gain insight into how to 
reduce Big Data’s impacts on privacy. 
That is what the second portion of this Article attempts to do.  It explains how 
the Clean Water Act16 and the Oil Pollution Act17 succeeded in reducing oil tanker 
spills.  It takes these strategies, adapts them for the privacy realm, and so produces 
a set of legal and policy recommendations for decreasing data spills.  It then turns 
to climate change policy—particularly laws and policies designed to promote clean 
energy innovation—and translate it into a federal government strategy for 
promoting technologies that can allow us to achieve the many benefits of Big Data, 
while reducing its harmful effects on privacy.  This will mitigate the glass house 
effect. 
This project is important, not only for the protection of privacy, but for the 
future of Big Data and data analytics itself.  Consider the following example: New 
York, Oakland, and other cities have been collecting massive amounts of 
surveillance camera data and mining it for law enforcement purposes.18  This 
promises to reduce crime and increase personal safety.19  It also constitutes a major 
business opportunity for IBM and Microsoft, the providers of this Big Data 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Giovanni Gavetti & Jan W. Rivkin How Strategists Really Think: Tapping the Power of 
Analogy, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 1, 2005, at 1. 
 14. Id. at 2. 
 15. Id. As Gavetti and Rivkin explain it, strategic, analogical reasoning involves 
a novel problem that has to be solved or a new opportunity that begs to be tapped; a 
specific prior setting that managers deem to be similar in its essentials; and a solution that 
managers can transfer from its original setting to the unfamiliar context. When managers 
face a problem, sense “Ah, I’ve seen this one before,” and reach back to an earlier 
experience for a solution, they are using analogy. 
Id. 
 16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012).  Congress added the Clean Water Act’s oil spill provisions in 
the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970), and in the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). 
 17. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990). 
 18. See Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
13, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-as-
surveillance-grows-in-cities.html. 
 19. Id. 
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service.20  However, the program has come under fire for compiling “data about the 
everyday movements and habits of law-abiding residents, raising legal and ethical 
questions about tracking people so closely.”21  At least one city has placed a 
moratorium on the use of some surveillance devices such as license plate readers.22  
As this example shows, Big Data promises many beneficial uses and applications.  
It offers crime reduction, improved health and safety, new services and industries, 
greater efficiency, and much more.  Yet, left unaddressed, its alarming impacts on 
individual privacy could provoke a political backlash that will inhibit and limit its 
use.23  Some organizations, anticipating such a reaction, have already “clamped 
down on their sensitive data, uncertain about what, if anything, they can release 
without jeopardizing the privacy of individuals.”24  “If privacy concerns are not 
adequately addressed, they may stall or disrupt the deployment of new technologies 
that offer many potential economic and quality-of-life benefits to consumers.”25  In 
order to unlock the great potential of Big Data, society must find ways to address 
and prevent the privacy threats that it poses.26  “Big data is the new oil” is a 
powerful analogy that can suggest strategies for achieving this. 
II. BIG DATA IS THE NEW OIL (POLLUTION) 
Big Data and data analytics will create many important benefits for society.  
The positive side of the “Big Data is the new oil” analogy is, in many ways, an 
accurate comparison.  However, it is vital also to appreciate the negative dimension 
of the analogy—the comparison between Big Data’s privacy impacts and oil 
pollution.  As explained above, it is only by doing so that society will be able to 
unlock Big Data’s great potential.  The positive and negative dimensions of the 
analogy are linked: in order to have the first, one must also explore and address the 
second.   
The oil-based economy generates two main types of pollution: oil spills that 
despoil waters, beaches and coastlines; and carbon emissions that contribute to 
climate change.27  Each of these forms of oil-based pollution is analogous to Big 
                                                                                                     
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See CAVOUKIAN & JONAS, supra note 3, at 3  (explaining that “technological advances improve 
our ability to exploit Big Data, potential privacy concerns could stir a regulatory backlash that would 
dampen the data economy and stifle innovation”); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of 
Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63 (2012) (suggesting the same). 
 24. Erica Klarreich & Simons Science News, Privacy by the Numbers: A New Approach to 
Safeguarding Data, SCI. AM. (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/privacy-by-
the-numbers-a-new-approach-to-safeguarding-data. 
 25. DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE NEED FOR AN R&D ROADMAP FOR 
PRIVACY 1 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www2.itif.org/2012-privacy-roadmap.pdf. 
 26. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, UNLOCKING THE VALUE OF PERSONAL DATA: FROM COLLECTION 
TO USAGE 11-13 (Feb. 2013), available at http://www3.weforum.org/ 
docs/WEF_IT_UnlockingValuePersonalData_CollectionUsage_Report_2013.pdf (explaining that better 
privacy governance will allow the continued and expanded use of Big Data). 
 27. The use of oil and oil-derivatives such as gasoline contribute to other types of pollution such as 
the release of volatile organic compounds that produce ground-level ozone (i.e., smog), leaks from 
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Data’s privacy impacts. 
A. Data Spills are Like Oil Spills 
The extraction, transportation and storage of oil and oil-based derivatives (such 
as gasoline or home heating oil) inevitably lead to oil spills.  The 1989 Exxon 
Valdez spills that released 11 million gallons of crude oil into Alaska’s Prince 
William Sound,28 and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil gusher in the Gulf of 
Mexico,29 are dramatic examples, but hardly the only ones. There have been many, 
many other oil spills, both on land and at sea.  Oil spills can injure coastlines, 
beaches, fish, marine ecosystems, and water quality.30  They can also damage 
commercial industries, such as fishing or tourism. In all of these ways, oil spills 
cause great damage.31 
Data spills do too.  Since 2005, there have been more than four thousand 
reported data breach incidents,32 an estimate that likely undercounts the true 
number.33  Large-scale, recent incidents include the 2013 Target Thanksgiving and 
Christmas shopping season security breach that released an estimated 70-110 
million records;34 the 2007 TJX Company’s international release of an estimated 
100 million records; 35 and the 2011 Sony release of 101 million records, including 
over 12 million unencrypted credit card numbers.36   
Data brokers37 and other users of Big Data38 contribute substantially to the 
                                                                                                     
underground storage tanks, and other forms of air and land pollution.  Oil spills and carbon emissions 
are two of the most significant forms of oil-based pollution and will be the focus here. 
 28. Exxon Valdez Spill Profile, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/learning/exxon.htm 
(last updated Jan. 16, 2014). 
 29. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_ 
oil_spill (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).  
 30. FRED BOSSELMAN, ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 320, 333 (3d ed. 2010). 
 31. E. A. Barry-Pheby, The Growth of Environmental Justice and Environmental Protection in 
International Law: In the Context of Regulation of the Arctic’s Offshore Oil Industry, 13 SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. L. & POL’Y 48 (2013). 
 32. See Chronology of Data Breaches, supra note 11.  In many spills, the number of records 
released is unknown.  The estimate does not include these incidents.  See id.  It further excludes spills, 
of which there may be many, that do not release Social Security Numbers or financial information.  See 
id.  
 33. This estimate includes only those breaches that involved social security numbers or financial 
information, and that excludes the many breaches for which the number of records released is not 
known. See id. 
 34. See id. (explaining that Target “customers who used a payment card at any of Target's stores 
nationwide between November 27, 2013 and December 15, 2013 may have had their payment card 
information copied for fraudulent purposes. Customer names, credit or debit card numbers, card 
expiration dates, and card security codes were taken and have appeared on the black market.”) 
 35. See id. (describing the 2003-2006 security breach at TJX that released data about “credit card, 
debit card, check, and merchandise return transactions.”) 
 36. See id. (describing the cybercriminal attack on the Sony data center in San Diego). 
 37. See Jessica Rich, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Privacy Today and 
the FTC’s 2014 Privacy Agency, Address Before the Int’l Ass’n of Privacy Prof’ls (Dec. 6, 2013), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-today-ftcs-
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problem.39  For example, Acxiom, a major data broker, possesses an average of 
1,500 data points on 500 million active consumers worldwide, including the 
majority of American adults.40  A 2003 Acxiom data breach released an estimated 
1.6 billion records containing personal information.41 
If data is the new oil, then these data releases are the new oil spills.  In fact, 
they have come to be known as “data spills.”42  The analogy runs deep.  Just like 
oil spills, data spills cause different types of damages.  These include identity theft, 
in which criminals use released personal information to impersonate the individual 
and withdraw money, open credit cards, take out loans, or make purchases in that 
person’s name;43 the increased risk of identity theft, which causes the victims to 
incur prevention costs (e.g., paying for credit monitoring) and to experience worry 
                                                                                                     
2014-privacy-agency/131206privacytodayjrich.pdf (identifying data brokers as a primary example of an 
industry that uses Big Data). 
 38. See generally STAFF REPORT FOR CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER, OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & 
INVESTIGATIONS: MAJORITY STAFF, S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANS., A REVIEW OF THE DATA 
BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES 
(Dec. 18, 2013), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/ 
?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0d2b3642-6221-4888-a631-08f2f255b577 (explaining that contemporary data 
brokers use extremely large amounts of personal data). 
 39. The FTC defines data brokers as “companies that collect information, including personal 
information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling such 
information to their customers for various purposes, including verifying an individual’s identity, 
differentiating records, marketing products, and preventing financial fraud.”  FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 68 (2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations-
businesses-policymakers. 
 40. See Natasha Singer, You For Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-
marketing.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
 41. Acxiom Data Breaches, PSEUDO-FLAW.NET, http://pseudo-flaw.net/content/acxiom-data-
breaches (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).  Two data breaches at ChoicePoint, in 2003 and 2005, released the 
personal financial records of 163,000 consumers, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; 
To Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 26, 
2006), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2006/01/choicepoint-settles-data-security-breach-
charges-pay-10-million, and resulted in at least 800 documented cases of identity theft, see Rich, supra 
note 37.  LexisNexis, Dun & Bradstreet, Kroll Background America Inc., and the National White Collar 
Crime Center, who rank amongst the largest consumer and business data aggregators, recently revealed 
that they too experienced a large data spill.  Data Broker Giants Hacked by ID Theft Service, 
KREBSONSECURITY (Sept. 13, 2013), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/09/data-broker-giants-hacked-by-
id-theft-service; Data Broker Hackers Also Compromised NW3C, KREBS ON SEC. (Oct. 13, 2013) 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/10/data-broker-hackers-also-compromised-nw3c. 
 42. See, e.g., Brett Glass, Tower Records Suffers Massive Data Spill, EXTREMETECH (Dec. 12, 
2002, 5:51 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/52810-tower-records-suffers-massive-data-spill. 
 43. Victims of identity theft must often spend considerable amounts of money and time contesting 
the charges or liabilities, restoring their credit, and reclaiming their identity, if they can fully achieve 
this at all.  Some analysts distinguish between identity fraud and identity theft.  TERRI CULLEN, THE 
WALL ST. JOURNAL. COMPLETE IDENTITY THEFT GUIDEBOOK: HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF FROM THE 
MOST PERVASIVE CRIME IN AMERICA 11-12 (2007).  Identity fraud is when a criminal uses stolen 
sensitive personal information to steal money from bank accounts, open credit lines using the victim’s 
information, or steal from existing credit card accounts.  Id at 20.  Identity theft is when a criminal uses 
the stolen, sensitive, personal information to actually impersonate the victim.  Id.  
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and stress; and the release of sensitive data (e.g., sexual orientation, HIV status), 
which can cause the victims to experience acute embarrassment and/or stigma.  Oil 
and data spills are also similar in that each tends to impose small harms on a large 
number of people.  This creates both collective action and free-rider problems for 
any tort claimants seeking damages for such injuries.  The availability of class 
actions notwithstanding, these common features of oil and data spills frequently 
frustrate tort remedies and may justify some type of statutory response.  Finally, in 
both oil and data spills, size matters.  Just as large oil spills generally cause more 
damage than small ones, so big data spills frequently create more harm than smaller 
releases.  They affect more people.  They also increase the chance that hackers and 
criminals will be able to re-identify purported “anonymized” databases since larger 
amounts of data increase the probability of correlation with other, identified data, 
and so facilitate re-identification.44  For all of these reasons, data spills—
particularly big data spills—are analogous to oil spills. 
B. The Glass House Effect 
Big Data’s privacy injuries are also analogous to the second principal type of 
oil-based pollution: carbon emissions and climate change.  The combustion of oil 
and other fossil fuels has generated a layer of carbon dioxide in the upper 
atmosphere that allows in the sun’s rays but then traps its heat.45  This “greenhouse 
effect” contributes to global warming and climate change, disturbs ecosystems and 
weather patterns, and so makes the earth less hospitable for human and natural 
life.46  In much the same way, the information economy, and Big Data technologies 
in particular, are generating a mass of data that is expanding at an exponential rate.  
According to one estimate, ninety percent of the world’s data, from the beginning 
of human history until the present, has been produced in just the past two years.47  
This total is projected to double every two years for the foreseeable future.48  Data 
is growing even faster than atmospheric carbon.  
Just as the accumulation of greenhouse gases traps the sun’s heat, so the 
accumulation of data concentrates the hot glare of public scrutiny.  It reveals and 
shines a light on personal information about medical conditions, sexual orientation, 
political interests, intellectual explorations, and all other manner of sensitive, 
personal information.  This can make us more likely to conform, and less likely to 
                                                                                                     
 44. See CAVOUKIAN & JONAS, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining that “Big Data can increase the risk of 
re-identification”). 
 45. ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 1207-
09 (7th ed. 2013); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2008), available at https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC]. 
 46. IPCC, supra note 45, at 26; PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 45, at 1207-09. 
 47. Big Data, for Better or Worse: 90% of World’s Data Generated Over Last Two Years, SCI. 
DAILY (May 22, 2013), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130522085217.htm; MAYER-
SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 151 (“The size and scale of data collection will increase by 
leaps and bounds as storage costs continue to plummet and analytic tools become ever more powerful.”) 
 48. Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html. 
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experiment, explore, and so to find and become who we want or need to be.  In so 
doing, Big Data makes the social world less hospitable for the full flowering and 
development of the human personality which requires a degree of shade and shelter 
in order to flourish.49  As Julie Cohen has so insightfully put it, it creates a “subtle 
yet fundamental shift in the content of our character, a blunting and blurring of 
rough edges and sharp lines. . . . The condition of no-privacy threatens not only to 
chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the 
force of our aspiration to it.”50 
This is not the greenhouse effect, but the glass house effect.  Big Data is 
creating a world in which each of us is increasingly living in a glass house where 
many of our most personal features—our relationships, anxieties, political beliefs, 
interests, sexual desires, location, purchases, criminal and financial history, and 
much else—are observable by others.  One need only think about the National 
Security Agency’s collection and storage of who we call and what we do on the 
Web; or the fact that Google accesses and reads our Gmail messages; or that 
mobile phone apps invisibly collect our location and contact information, even 
when they are not at all relevant to the service that the app provides, to get a sense 
of what is happening.  Just as the greenhouse effect alters the earth’s climate in 
ways that make it less friendly to natural ecosystems, so the glass house effect 
changes the social climate in ways that make it far less conducive to personal 
development.  If this trend continues, we will pass on to our children a depleted 
ecosystem for the cultivation of the human personality. It is vital to human 
development, creativity and innovation that we prevent this. 
It is equally vital to future of Big Data.  As mentioned above, Big Data and 
data analytics possess a truly great potential to enhance human health, quality of 
life, the environment, economic prosperity and much more.51  Yet this activity’s 
harmful by-products—the privacy injuries that it creates—are already throwing up 
obstacles for the field. If left unaddressed, they may well produce a social and 
political backlash against Big Data, one that could significantly reduce the use of 
data analytics and prevent it from fully making its valuable contributions.  In order 
to unlock Big Data’s potential and achieve its great benefits, it is essential 
simultaneously to address and mitigate the privacy harms that it creates.52  Those 
who care about privacy, and those who wish to advance Big Data and data 
analytics, should all be interested in finding solutions to Big Data’s privacy 
impacts. 
                                                                                                     
 49. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1373, 1424 (2000) (explaining that “autonomy in a contingent world requires a zone of relative 
insulation from outside scrutiny and interference—a field of operation within which to engage in the 
conscious construction of self.”) 
 50. Id. at 1426. 
 51. See CAVOUKIAN & JONAS, supra note 3; See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4; 
See MANYIKA ET AL, supra note 6; see Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 52. Brill Lecture, supra note 2 (discussing the operation of Big Data in a way that “respects 
consumer privacy and engenders consumer trust, allowing big data to reach its full potential to benefit 
us all.”) 
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III. OIL POLLUTION LAW AND POLICY AS A MODEL 
This takes us back to Gavetti and Rivkin and the power of analogy.53  The 
preceding section has argued that Big Data’s privacy injuries (the new problem) are 
analogous to oil pollution (the familiar one).  The next step would be take the 
approaches that society has employed to address oil pollution, translate them into 
the realm of Big Data and privacy, and so develop strategies for reducing Big 
Data’s privacy impacts. 
As described above, the oil and privacy problems are analogous in two distinct 
ways: oil spills are analogous to data spills; and the increase in greenhouse gases is 
similar to the accumulation of Big Data.  When it comes to oil, these two sorts of 
pollution are distinct and addressing them requires different strategies.  It therefore 
makes sense to separate out the two types of privacy harms associated with Big 
Data—data spills, and the glass house effect—and explore separately what 
environmental regulation can teach us about addressing each of them. 
A. The History of Oil Pollution Law Suggests Ways to Reduce Data Spills 
At the beginning of the oil era, in the 19th Century, the law supported those 
who produced and transported this valuable substance and insulated them, to some 
degree, from large-scale, potentially uninsurable liability for the damage that their 
activities caused.54  
To begin with, tort law required victims of an oil spill to demonstrate that the 
spiller had acted negligently—a difficult task in a risky field where even those who 
took due care could experience accidents and spills.55  Further, the law limited the 
types of damages that were legally cognizable.  Maritime tort law recognized 
property damage from oil spills, but not injuries to fishing, tourism and other non-
property-based commercial injuries.56  Finally, as if tort liability were not yet 
sufficiently constrained, Congress passed the Limitation on Liability Act of 1851, 
which capped oil spill damages at the value of the vessel and freight remaining 
after the accident.57  Congress intended this statute to facilitate the transportation of 
an otherwise uninsurable, yet economically critical, cargo.  Over time, it came to 
produce patently absurd results. For example, under the terms of the Act the 1967 
wreck of the Torrey Canyon oil tanker, which spilled over 100,000 tons of crude oil 
into the English channel and despoiled 100 miles of French and British coasts, 
would have resulted in only $50 in damages—the value of the sole remaining 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Gavetti & Rivkin, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 54. See generally Mark A. White, The 1851 Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act: Should the 
Courts Deliver the Final Blow?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 821 (2004) (explaining how legal doctrines 
supported the growth of the nascent American oil transportation industry). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 307 (1927); Louisiana v. M/V 
Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 57. Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. app. § 183 (1984) (current version at 46 U.S.C. 
§§ 30501-30512 (2012)). 
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lifeboat.58  
Congress began to correct the situation in the 1970 and 1972 Amendments to 
the Clean Water Act.59  Following the massive Exxon Valdez oil spill, it took even 
more vigorous action in the 1990 Oil Pollution Act.60  Together, these statutes re-
write oil pollution law.  They allow the government to clean up an oil spill and 
bring an action against the responsible party to recoup the clean-up costs,61 thereby 
reducing the collective action and free-rider problems that undermine private tort 
actions.  They recognize new causes of action for damage to economic, as opposed 
to simply property-based, interests.62  For example, it allows commercial fishermen 
and owners of businesses that rely on beach tourism to sue for the damage that an 
oil spill caused to their enterprise.63  Although the statutes do not expressly address 
the point, courts have interpreted them as rejecting the negligence-based tort 
regime and creating strict liability for defendants with respect to oil removal and 
clean-up costs.64  The statutes greatly increased the amount of damages for which 
oil spill defendants could be held liable.65  Today, vessels over 3,000 tons can face 
liability of up to $22,000,000 per incident.66  Finally, the Oil Pollution Act requires 
all new oil transportation vessels operating in U.S. waters to employ a double hull 
design that greatly decreases the chance of an oil spill.67  Taken together, these 
                                                                                                     
 58. Jeffrey D. Morgan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Look at its Impact on the Oil Industry, 6 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994). 
 59. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). 
 60. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990). 
 61. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, §§ 11(c)(1), (f), 84 Stat. at 93 (codified as amended at 
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at 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (2012)) (allowing claims for “[d]amages equal to the loss of profits or 
impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property 
or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.”); see also Murchison, supra note 61. 
 63. See John C. P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the Deepwater 
Horizon Spill, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 335 (2011) (describing newly available claims); Antonio J. 
Rodriguez and Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1 (1990) (same); In re 
Settoon Towing LLC, 2009 WL 4730969 (E.D. La. 2009) (allowing plaintiffs’ claim for loss of profits 
to go forward); Dunham-Price Group, LLC v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 2010 WL 1285446 (W.D. La. 
2010) (allowing a pure economic claim for loss of use, increased expense, business interruption and 
related damages under the OPA); FGDI LLC v. M/V Lorelay, 193 Fed. App’x. 853 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(allowing a grain elevator owner to bring his claim based on the delay that an oil spill caused his 
business). 
 64. Murchison, supra note 61, at 922.  See, e.g., In re Oriental Republic of Uru., 821 F. Supp. 928, 
931 (D. Del. 1992); Total Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 178, 180 (1987); United States v. 
M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). 
 65. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 1004(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 491-92 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 
2704(a)(1) (2012)).  The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 raised the limits to the greater of $1,200 per ton, or 
$10,000,000 for a vessel greater than 3,000 tons, or $2,000,000 for a smaller vessel.  Id. 
 66. Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-241, § 603(a)(1), 120 Stat. 
516, 553 (2006) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1) (2012)) (raising the liability amounts). 
 67. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 4115(a), 104 Stat. at 517-18 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 
3703a (2012)). 
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strategies have significantly improved the oil spill problem.  “The Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990 is widely viewed as an enormous success.  It is credited with improving the 
safety of oil tankers operating in U.S. waters and its double hull requirement has 
now been adopted internationally.”68 
This environmental law success story holds important lessons for Big Data.  
As with the early laws governing the oil industry, today’s doctrines appear to favor 
the production, storage and transfer of the “new oil.”  Plaintiffs alleging damages 
from data security breaches must generally show negligence, although this is 
difficult to demonstrate in an area of uncertain and rapidly evolving security 
standards and practices.69  Even where plaintiffs can prove their case, courts 
generally allow damages only for concrete economic injuries associated with 
identity theft.70  They refuse to recognize the other, non-economic damages that 
data spills create.71  For example, some data breach plaintiffs, relying on cases that 
award damages for fear of illness from exposure to pathogens, have sought 
damages for fear of identity theft based on release of personal information;72 courts 
have rejected these claims.73  They have similarly denied claims for emotional 
distress damages based solely on the disclosure of a plaintiff’s personal 
information, allowing these claims to go forward only where the plaintiff alleges 
fraudulent use of the information.74  Seen in combination, these doctrines suggest 
that—perhaps in an effort to bolster the information economy—the law favors the 
collectors and users of personal information over those who suffer damage from 
data spills.  This is similar to the law governing oil spills prior to the 1970 Clean 
Water Act.  Highly damaging spills such as the wreck of the Torrey Canyon, or the 
Exxon Valdez, spurred Congress to conduct a long-overdue revision of liability 
                                                                                                     
 68. PERCIVAL, supra note 45, at 137. 
 69. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the 
Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 263-65, 268 (2007). 
 70. Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation - A Tough Road for Plaintiffs, 55 
BOSTON B.J. 27, 29 (2011); see, e.g., In re Hannaford Bros. Co., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 133 (D. Me. 
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for concrete, economic damages). 
 71. See Anderson, 659 F.3d at 162. 
 72. Derek A. Bishop, No Harm No Foul: Limits on Damages Awards for Individuals Subject to a 
Data Breach, 4 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 1, ¶ 12 (2008). 
 73. See, e.g., Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Healthcare Alliance, Civ. 03-0185PHXSRB, 2005 WL 
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compensable as a matter of Indiana law”); Pinero v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv. Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 710, 
716 (E.D. La. 2009) (holding the plaintiff could not recover damages for fear and credit monitoring, 
among other things, as these damages are “merely speculative”); Carolyn A. Deverich, Brian R. Strange, 
& David A. Holop, Into the Breach: Plaintiffs Have Been Increasingly Successful in Gaining Injunctive 
Relief for Online Security Breaches, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2012, at 27-28 (discussing case law in this area); 
Bishop, supra note 72 (same). 
 74. Bishop, supra note 72, ¶ 23. 
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limits and tort doctrines.75  High-profile data spills, such as Target’s recent release 
of 70-110 million customers’ credit card and other personal information, may 
eventually prompt a similar legal transformation with respect to data security 
breaches.  Why should society wait for the Big Data equivalent of the Exxon 
Valdez spill to require companies to internalize the full costs of their data security 
breaches?  Big Data has arrived.  The law need no longer nurture it.  Rather, it 
should require the users of Big Data to internalize their external costs, thus making 
the information economy sustainable in the long term. 
Employing the power of analogy, it should be possible to take the successful 
environmental law measures described above, adapt them for the data spill purpose, 
and so develop strategies to prevent data spills.  For example, Congress could take 
a page from the Clean Water Act and pass legislation that authorizes government 
“clean up” of data spills (e.g., provision of credit monitoring, counseling and 
identity theft recovery services).76  The agency that carries out the clean-up could 
then seek reimbursement from those responsible for the spill.  This would reduce 
the collective action and free-rider problems that would otherwise inhibit private 
cost recovery lawsuits.   
Like the Oil Pollution Act, such legislation could expand tort liability and 
require courts to recognize the non-economic damages that data spills create.77  For 
example, Congress could expressly allow plaintiffs to seek damages for the 
emotional distress caused by the release of important personal information or from 
the risk of identity theft.  Additionally, such a statute could establish strict liability 
for data spills, thus eliminating the need to prove a defendant’s negligence.78  
Finally, just as the Oil Pollution Act requires oil transporters to design their ships in 
an environmentally protective way,79 so the legislation could require information-
intensive firms to utilize privacy by design.80  If oil tankers must use double hulls, 
                                                                                                     
 75. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 11(c)(1), (f), 84 Stat. 91, 93 
(1970) (codified as amended at 33 USC § 1321(c)(1), (f) (2012)). 
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 79. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 4115(a), 104 Stat. at 517-18 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. 
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 80. See, e.g., ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES (2011), 
available at www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2009/08/7foundationalprinciples.pdf (describing 
seven key features of privacy by design); ANN CAVOUKIAN & JEFF JONAS, PRIVACY BY DESIGN IN THE 
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perhaps data security systems should have to employ two-factor authentication.81  
These are preliminary thoughts intended to illustrate how the oil-Big Data analogy 
can generate creative ideas about ways to address Big Data’s privacy impacts.82  
Further work will be required to assess whether these ideas can be developed into 
full-fledged policy proposals.   
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY AS A MODEL 
Even if all these measures were adopted, they would only address the first 
aspect of the Big Data privacy issue: data spills.  They would do nothing to reduce 
the glass house effect, the deeper and more profound problem.  The glass house 
effect is analogous to climate change.  So the question becomes: is it possible to 
translate climate change law and policy into the realm of privacy, and so generate 
ideas on how to protect privacy in the era of Big Data? 
A. Climate Change Law and Policy 
The human combustion of fossil fuels, a significant contributor to climate 
change, lies at the very foundation of all industrial economies.  This feature 
strongly influences climate change law and policy.  It makes it difficult to employ 
traditional emission control requirements in order to achieve reductions.  The sheer 
number and diversity of emissions sources defies the development and enforcement 
of such standards for all but the largest-emitting sectors.  Moreover, carbon 
emissions are so huge and so pervasive that requiring a limited number of emitters 
to reduce their emissions by some feasible percentage will not achieve the decrease 
needed to prevent climate change and its associated ills.   
Achieving this goal requires, not control requirements for fossil fuel-based 
energy technologies, but rather the large-scale implementation of alternative energy 
technologies.83  Developed and emerging economies need to shift to clean energy 
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 82. See Gavetti & Rivkin, supra note 13, at 6 (explaining that analogies “can spark breakthrough 
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sources such as solar, hydrogen, geothermal, wind, water, and (if it can be done 
more safely) nuclear energy technologies.84  Climate change policy seeks to 
facilitate and bring about this technological transformation.  Analysts suggest that 
such a shift will not only reduce carbon emissions, but that it could also generate 
new businesses, industries, and jobs as American engineers and manufactures meet 
the need for clean energy technologies at home and abroad.85  Some see this as one 
of the nation’s most important opportunities for future economic growth and job 
creation.86  The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
concluded that “American economic competitiveness, environmental stewardship, 
and enhanced security depend on picking up the pace of energy technology 
innovation . . . .”87 
B. Policies to Promote the Clean Energy Transformation  
Given these economic opportunities, one might assume that the market alone 
would meet the need for clean energy technologies.  That is not the case. Three 
market failures—negative externalities, the public goods problem, and positive 
spillovers from basic research—lead the private sector to underinvest in clean 
energy technologies.88  Government can correct for these market failures and so 
produce something closer to an optimal level of investment.89  
A negative externality exists when the producer of a good does not have to 
bear the full costs of production and is, instead, able to “externalize” these costs 
onto others.90  Environmental damage is an important type of negative externality.91  
                                                                                                     
order to achieve a “low-carbon transformation for purposes of both climate change risk mitigation and 
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Newsroom/Press_Release/Innovate,%20Manufacture,%20Compete.pdf (stating that “clean energy helps 
create employment, manufacturing, and export opportunities while reducing the pollution and risks 
associated with current energy patterns and technologies”). 
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 87. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 83, at 1-2. 
 88. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRODUCTION OF FUELS AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 1, 8-9 (Mar. 2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-06-FuelsandEnergy_Brief.pdf (describing 
externality and positive spillover issues); AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 10-11 
(describing public good and positive spillover issues). 
 89. Id. at 10-11 (making the case for an active government role in energy innovation). 
 90. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 44 (5th ed. 2007) (explaining 
that “[t]he reason the market fails in the presence of external costs is that the generator of the externality 
does not have to pay for harming others”). 
 91. Id. 
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When a company pollutes, it does not itself experience most of the health and 
environmental impacts of that pollution.  Rather, it externalizes these costs onto the 
surrounding members of the public.92  Since the company does not bear the 
majority of these costs it has little reason to invest in technologies that would 
reduce or prevent them, even where the benefits from such technologies (in terms 
of health and environmental gains) would exceed their cost.  Negative externalities 
thus lead to sub-optimal investment in pollution reduction technologies.93  The 
climate change area follows this general pattern.  The operators of coal-fired power 
plants and other companies that burn fossil fuels and emit greenhouse gases 
contribute to climate change.  However, much of the damage that climate change 
causes—the rising sea levels, spread of disease, species extinctions and droughts—
does not affect these companies directly.  Rather, the companies are able to 
externalize these costs onto the public.94  They therefore tend to invest too little in 
technologies that would prevent them.95 
The public goods problem is related, though distinct.  It looks at the 
hypothetical company that does decide to invest in and implement clean energy 
technology.  Assume that such a company decreases its greenhouse gas emissions 
and so reduces the harmful effects of climate change.  While it has created a good 
(a more stable climate) that many might be willing to pay for, it will not be able to 
charge for this good because it will not be able to exclude anyone from receiving 
the benefits of it.96  Climate stability is a “public good” in the case that, if it is 
available to one, then it is available to all.97  Since the company cannot charge for 
this good, it has little incentive to invest in producing it, even where the value of 
the good would exceed the costs of production.98  Thus the public goods problem, 
much like the negative externality one, leads to underinvestment in clean energy 
technology.   
The third market failure is rooted in the fact that investments in basic research 
frequently yield general scientific knowledge that, while highly useful, cannot be 
the subject of a patent.99  As a result, those who make such discoveries must share 
them with others, including their competitors.100  The benefits, in effect, “spill 
over” from the one that created them to others who will also find them useful.  
Since the creator cannot exclude others from its discoveries, it cannot charge for 
them.  This greatly reduces its incentive to engage in basic research, even where the 
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2014] THE GLASS HOUSE EFFECT 389 
benefits of doing so would exceed the costs.101  The result is underinvestment in the 
fundamental research on which many important innovations are grounded.102    
Federal clean energy policies seek to correct for these market failures.  Some 
fund or otherwise seek to stimulate basic research.103  Others seek to address the 
externality and public goods problems by requiring, or subsidizing, private sector 
investment in renewable energy so as to produce a more optimal level of it.104  For 
the most part, the private sector supports government taking this role.105  Federal 
clean energy policies include: 
• Direct investments in clean energy technologies.106 
• Loan programs107 (including both direct loans 108 and loan guarantees) 
that support private sector investment in clean energy.109 
• Tax preferences for firms that utilize or invest in clean energy, 
including special deductions, special tax rates, tax credits, and grants 
in lieu of tax credits.110 
• Government procurement of renewable energy to meet its own energy 
needs.111  
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ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra note 86, at 10 (explaining that “the privacy sector has tended to 
systematically under-invest in R&D relative to the potential gains to society–even where a market for 
the desired technology exists” (emphasis in original)). 
 103. See id. at 16.  Such policies assume that private companies will pick up on the results of this 
research and use it to develop their own patentable and marketable inventions and products.  This 
strategy has proven effective in other areas.  For example, government scientists mapped out natural 
resources, surveyed routes for railroads, conducted basic research on nuclear technologies and, more 
recently, created a distributed network of computers (ARPANET) that laid the foundation for the 
Internet.  Id. at 11-12. 
 104. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 9.  The government can also achieve this by taxing 
the emission of greenhouse gases or other pollutants so as to internalize the environmental costs and so 
give firms an incentive to reduce this pollution.  Id.  This strategy, while perhaps the most cost-effective 
one as applied to the clean energy area, does not translate as easily into a policy for addressing the glass 
house effect.  Accordingly, this Article focuses on subsidies in their various forms as a way of 
encouraging technological innovation, rather than on fees or taxes. 
 105. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 85 at 32. 
 106. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 7.  One of the most successful such programs has 
been the Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy (ARPA-E) initiative 
which funds “high-risk, high-payoff research” in clean energy technologies.  Id. 
 107. Id. at 7; EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 7 (June 
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/ 
president27sclimateactionplan.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN] (describing a 
Department of Energy loan guarantee program, which supports “investments in innovative 
technologies”).  
 108. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 7. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 2. 
 111. PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 107, at 7-8.  The federal government is 
nation’s largest consumer of energy.  See id. at 7.  By insisting that its suppliers meet some of its energy 
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• Comprehensive planning and coordination of government and private 
sector clean energy strategies.112  To this end, the President has 
initiated a Quadrennial Energy Review to “identify the threats, risks, 
and opportunities for U.S. energy and climate security, enabling the 
federal government to translate policy goals into a set of analytically 
based, clearly articulated, sequenced and integrated actions, and 
proposed investments over a four-year planning horizon.”113 
• Performance-based clean energy requirements such as fuel efficiency 
standards for the auto industry,114 or renewable portfolio standards 
(generally passed at the state level), which require utilities to obtain a 
certain percentage of their energy from renewable sources.115 
While researchers have not yet evaluated all of these initiatives, initial studies 
suggest that government programs that fund energy research and development 
“often yielded benefits greater than its costs,”116 but that government funding for 
“later stages in the [technology] development process has been far less cost-
effective.”117 
C. Promoting Innovation in Clean Data Technology 
In much the same way that oil and other fossil fuels lie at the foundation of the 
smokestack economy, so Big Data is becoming a foundational building block of the 
information economy.118  It is now so pervasive and powerful that traditional 
regulatory measures such as notice and choice, or purpose limitations, simply 
cannot constrain its privacy impacts.  Notice fails because the increasingly 
ubiquitous collection and use of personal information renders individual notice 
virtually impossible, and because data analysts often cannot predict (and so cannot 
provide notice of) how they will use data sets.119  Without notice, choice fails as 
                                                                                                     
needs through renewable energy sources, the government can help to create a market for early 
renewable technologies.  This can be especially helpful at the early stages of deployment while 
producers are working to bring down the cost of these technologies. 
 112. Id.   
 113. This is needed to pull together the “amalgam” of energy-related policies and meld them into an 
integrated approach that can utilize resources more efficiently and effectively.  See PRESIDENT’S 
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 107, at 8. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See generally Ivan Gold & Nidhi Thakar, A Survey of State Renewable Portfolio Standards: 
Square Pegs for Round Climate Change Holes? 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 183 (2010) 
(surveying state renewable portfolio standard programs). 
 116. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 88, at 9 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY 
RESEARCH AT DOE: WAS IT WORTH IT? ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND FOSSIL ENERGY RESEARCH 1978 TO 
2000 (Nat’l Acad. Press 2001)). 
 117. Id. at 2. See also REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 83, at 3-4 
(dividing the innovation process into four phases—invention, translation, adoption and diffusion—and 
arguing that federal support is more effective when targeted at the first of these stages). 
 118. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 16 (explaining that Big Data “is 
becoming a significant corporate asset, a vital economic input, and the foundation of new business 
models.  It is the oil of the information economy.”). 
 119. Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY 
L. 74, 78 (2013); WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 26, at 11. 
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well.  Individuals cannot give meaningful consent to uses of which they have had 
inadequate notice.120  Purpose limitations create a direct conflict with Big Data, the 
value of which lies in continuously re-purposing massive data sets and finding new 
and unanticipated uses for them.121  For all of these reasons, traditional privacy 
regulation—notice, choice, purpose limitation—will prove ineffective as applied to 
Big Data.  As in the climate change area, the solution lies more in technological 
transformation than in traditional regulatory responses.  
Mitigation of the glass house effect will require the development and use of 
new “clean data” technologies122 that allow society to derive the benefits of Big 
Data, while minimizing its privacy impacts. Such technologies are already 
beginning to emerge.123  Privacy-technology experts, Oliveira and Zaïne, have 
defined a set of criteria for “privacy-preserving data mining technologies” 
(PPDM)—data mining technologies that “encompass[] the dual goal of meeting 
privacy requirements and providing valid data mining results.”124  A number of 
emerging technologies seek to achieve this goal.  For example, differential privacy 
techniques allow analysts to query Big Data but introduce a degree of “noise” into 
the response.125  This “noise” creates an interference that is large enough to 
disguise the presence or absence of any individual in the data set, yet small enough 
to ensure that the answer provided is still useful.126  On another front, efforts are 
being made to develop “new techniques to securely de-identify data.”127  Privacy-
                                                                                                     
 120. Rubinstein, supra note 119, at 75; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 7, at 260-61. 
 121. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 2, 103; WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra 
note 26, at 11. 
 122. See CAVOUKIAN & JONAS, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that attention should “shift from 
compliance with FIPs to proactively embedding privacy into the design of new technologies”). 
 123. See, e.g., Klarreich & Simons Science News, supra note 24 (discussing technologies that allow 
us to “get at these data without revealing private information”).  See also CYNTHIA DWORK, MICROSOFT 
RESEARCH, DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY 8-11 (2006), available at http://pdf.aminer.org/ 
000/267/828/differential_privacy.pdf (describing differential privacy techniques that allow users to ask 
questions of large data sets while preserving individual privacy); Stanley R. M. Oliveira, Privacy-
Preserving Data Mining, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DATA WAREHOUSING AND MINING (2d ed. 2008) 
(describing emerging data mining technologies that protect privacy and defining the groundwork for 
further research and development in this area). 
 124. OLIVEIRA & ZAÏANE, supra note 9, at 3. 
 125. See Klarreich & Simons Science News, supra note 24 (describing how a differential algorithm 
might “add noise” to an answer by adding or subtracting some number before returning the answer). See 
also DWORK, supra note 123  at 9-11 (giving examples of how noise may be added in certain formulas). 
 126. See DWORK, supra note 123, at 8-9. See also MICROSOFT CORP., DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR 
EVERYONE 3-5 (2012), available at http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=35409 
(showing an example of how differential privacy can yield useful and privacy-preserving answers).  “A 
differentially private data release algorithm allows researchers to ask practically any question about a 
database of sensitive information and provides answers that have been ‘blurred’ so that they reveal 
virtually nothing about any individual’s data–not even whether the individual was in the database in the 
first place.” Klarreich & Simons Science News, supra note 24.  To achieve this blurring effect, 
differential privacy establishes a piece of intermediary software that stands between the one asking the 
questions and the database itself.  MICROSOFT CORP., supra at 3.  This “privacy guard” calculates the 
minimum amount of noise needed to protect individual identities, and adds it to the answer that it 
provides to the analyst.  Id. 
 127. CASTRO, supra note 25, at 2. 
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preserving data mining and successful de-identification (assuming that the latter is 
possible)128 offer a glimpse of a more optimistic future.  However, most of these 
technologies remain at the experimental stage and have not yet been developed as 
commercial applications.129  
The further development of privacy-preserving data mining technologies will 
likely confront the same market failures that the generation of clean energy 
technologies has encountered.  In the clean data context, as in the clean energy one, 
investments in basic research will produce positive spillover effects that private 
investors cannot capture and monetize.130  As a result, the private sector will 
provide a sub-optimal level of investment in the development of such technologies.  
Moreover, a company’s privacy impacts constitute a negative externality, while its 
investments in privacy protection create a public good—consumer trust in the 
information economy as a whole.  These market failures, too, will produce sub-
optimal investment in privacy-preserving data mining technologies.  The rationale 
for government support for clean energy technologies thus applies with equal force 
to the development of these “clean data” technologies.  The United States should 
develop a privacy-preserving data mining technology agenda131 that parallels the 
nation’s strategy for promoting clean energy.132  
Drawing from the clean energy playbook, such an agenda could include:  
• Direct investments to support the development of technologies and 
techniques, such as differential privacy, that allow analysts to utilize 
Big Data but reduce the privacy impacts that result from such 
activities.  These investments should focus on support of basic 
research into such technologies.  It should further seek to support the 
progress of differential privacy and other existing techniques in order 
to move them past the experimental stage and bring them to the point 
of commercialization.   
• Loan programs (including direct loans and loan guarantees) that 
support private sector investment in privacy protective data mining 
technologies. 
• Tax preferences for data analytics or other firms that utilize or invest 
                                                                                                     
 128. See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (arguing that efforts to de-identify have failed and 
regulators must respond). 
 129. See MICROSOFT CORP., supra note 126, at 6 (explaining that differential privacy, while 
promising, “is [sic] still a research-level technology, not a commercial product, and . . . its potential 
implementation in real-life research and commercial scenarios . . . will present mathematical, 
computational, and policy challenges that will need to be addressed before it can go into production.”); 
MARTIN MEINTS & JAN MÖLLER, PRIVACY PRESERVING DATA MINING: A PROCESS CENTRIC VIEW 
FROM A EUROPEAN PROSPECTIVE 12 (2007) (stating that “PPDM is still an area of research and not 
readily implemented on the market yet.”) 
 130. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (explaining that basic research creates positive 
spillovers). 
 131. See CASTRO, supra note 25, at 2 (stating that “the U.S. government should create and fund a 
research and development (R&D) roadmap for privacy.”). 
 132. See generally REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 83 (setting 
out a strategy for promoting clean energy). 
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in such technologies.  These could include special deductions, tax 
rates, tax credits, and grants in lieu of tax credits. 
• A preference for firms that employ privacy-preserving data mining 
technologies in the federal government’s own purchase of data 
analytics services.  The federal government is a large consumer of 
these services.  If it gave a preference to such firms this could jump-
start the market for privacy-enhancing data mining technologies and 
so promote the development and commercialization of such products.   
• Planning and coordination of government and private sector strategies 
for the development of privacy-preserving data mining technologies.  
The federal government could play a coordinating role in which it 
sees the big picture, identifies funding gaps or particularly promising 
areas of development, and seeks to direct resources towards these 
priority areas.  As with the Federal Quadrennial Energy Review,133 
this should be a comprehensive planning process that involves 
relevant agencies and stakeholders and seeks to integrate existing 
efforts in order to marshal resources in the most effective way 
possible 
Such policies, and the further development of PPDM technologies, are 
essential for the preservation of privacy in a Big Data world.  They will prove 
useful to government agencies and private businesses that apply data mining to 
personal information.134  On a broader level, they make sense for any society that 
wishes to make greater use of Big Data and enjoy the many benefits it can provide.  
As mentioned above, a lack of investment in such technologies, and a consequent 
failure to address Big Data’s privacy impacts, could cause a social and political 
backlash that could impede further growth in this area.135  Privacy protections are 
essential to “unlocking the value of personal data.”136  The development of PPDM 
technologies may also provide an important economic opportunity.  Many 
countries and businesses will need such technologies if they are to exploit fully the 
benefits of Big Data and data analytics.  Those who develop and patent these new 
technologies will possess a competitive advantage in a global market for such 
goods and services.  
Additional development of privacy tools could also have a positive economic 
impact.  Investments in developing technological solutions to privacy problems 
would help create a network of developers with expertise in this domain.  
Developers of such tools would likely be even more competitive in countries with 
strict privacy regulations, where there may be a stronger market for privacy-
                                                                                                     
 133. PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 107, at 7-8. 
 134. See CASTRO, supra note 25, at 2 (stating that “every government agency that uses personally 
identifiable information (PII) might benefit, either directly or indirectly, from advances in privacy-
preserving data mining or new techniques to securely de-identify data.  Similarly, industries such as 
health care and financial services would benefit from this research as well.”). 
 135. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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enhanced products and services.137   
Politicians and policymakers in the U.S. have made the case that government 
investment in clean energy technologies could pay off in increased business 
activity, exports and jobs.138  Investments in clean data technologies could too, 
though probably on a smaller scale. 
The federal government does not yet appear to have fully recognized the 
important role that privacy-preserving data mining technologies can play.  While it 
has put been working to develop laws that will protect privacy better, and has been 
enforcing existing rules, it has put “relatively little effort . . . into considering how 
new technology might address many of the same privacy challenges.”139  It should 
now turn its attention to this policy challenge, just as it has done in the area of clean 
energy.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 “Big Data is the new oil” is a powerful analogy, indeed.  In six short words it 
helps us to envision Big Data’s great potential future.  It also helps us to grasp—
intuitively, and immediately—the threats that it poses.140  Data spills are like oil 
spills; they damage individual lives and livelihoods just like oil spills do.  The 
contemporary threat to individual privacy—what this Article has called the “glass 
house effect”—is like climate change.  We hear about the ways that corporations 
and the NSA are collecting, aggregating, and mining our data.  The ads we receive 
on our computers or mobile devices give us inklings as to what is happening out 
there in the data universe and how it is affecting us.  Yet the shift is so profound 
and pervasive that it almost escapes comprehension.  We know what is happening, 
and yet we do not know it.  We need a framework, a concept, an analogy to help us 
grasp something that cannot be understood in its entirety.   
Climate change is that analogy.  The change is in the very air around us; it is in 
the social climate in which we live.  A world that once offered some protection for 
our private comings and goings, our intellectual or political interests, our 
eccentricities, maladies and vulnerabilities, increasingly records them and makes 
them visible.  The great paradox is that, just as digitization and the Internet open 
wide doors for individual exploration, expression and growth, so they increasingly 
turn us into a surveillance society in which we feel observed and pressured to 
conform.  It is like industrial society, which provides us with new goods and tools 
that enhance our lives and at the same time threatens to despoil the natural 
environment on which we depend.   
The “Big Data is the new oil” analogy is valuable because it can help us to see 
both the tremendous promise of, and the threats from, Big Data.  It can enable us to 
grasp, in an instant, something big and mysterious, wonderful and dark, that is 
                                                                                                     
 137. CASTRO, supra note 25, at 2. 
 138. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 85, at 10; AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, supra 
note 86, at 9; REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 83, at 1-2.  
 139. Id. at 1. 
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happening in the world around us.  It can also help us to generate solutions.141  
Environmental law has developed measures to reduce oil spills and to prevent 
climate change.  These steps are incomplete and imperfect, particularly where 
climate change is concerned.  Yet they reflect a body of effort and thinking that, 
over time, has crystalized into specific policies, legal doctrines, and government 
investments.  We need not start from scratch in thinking about how to protect 
privacy in the era of Big Data. We can take advantage of the work that has already 
been done in the environmental field, translate it to the privacy issue, and emerge 
with a starting point for the new task.  That is the power of analogy; we should use 
that power.  
  
                                                                                                     
 141. Cf. id. at 3 (describing how analogical thinking can “spark creativity”). 
